1.
Senator UDALL:— So, in an ideal world, we would get the job
done militarily in the short term; in the medium and long term, we
would have a presence in the region, economically, diplomacy, and
politically.
Secretary CLINTON: Well, as we have with so many other countries—
obviously, we have troops in a limited number of countries
around the world; some have been there for 50, 60 years, but we
have long-term economic assistance and development programs in
many others. And we think that’s a likely outcome in both Afghanistan
and Pakistan, that we would be there with a long-term commitment.
Comment:
I believe that this slipped from her tounge. I mean it is easy to misunterstand her, the way she said it and many blogs interpreted that the US troops might stay for 50, 60 years. These blog writers simply ripped the connection of her statment from the question of the senator. I think this was taken out of context. The truth is that Clinton said, the more likely outcome would be a long-term economic assistance and development programms rather than having troops in Afghanistan for 50, 60 years. I mean, she is not that stupid to say this.
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2.
Senator HAGAN: (...)But, I do know that some of the countries have mentioned, in the
past, about starting their own withdrawals. In particular, I believe
Germany has suggested a transition by 2013, and they have 4,000
troops; Canada suggesting some pullout in 2011 in Kandahar—they
have 2500 troops; the Italian leaders, 2800 troops, leaving Herat by
December 2011; Dutch leaders suggesting they might want to pull
out by 2010. And I was just wondering if that is still a concern.
I’ll—Secretary Gates, if you have some information on that.
Secretary GATES: Well, it is a concern. The only two firm decisions
that have been made that I’m aware of are that the Dutch
will leave, next year, with their forces, and the Canadians, by the
end of 2011. These are parliamentary decisions that have been
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Comment:
The important thins in this text is that senator Hagan believes that Gemany has suggested a transition by 2013. No German politician mentions something about this. Secretary Gates said the the only two firm decisions were made by the Dutch and the Canadians, but the question is, why does/did he believe the Germans will pull out there troops in 2013? I mean this man is an insider. I thing this is also something which slipped out of a tounge. Were did he get this information? Does he know something we don't know? He mentioned an exact year and I don't think that he just said something from his stomach.
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3.
Senator LEMIEUX:— Just to touch quickly on the international
partner issue, you mentioned bringing 5- to 7,000 more troops from
international partners. In the past, you have been, as you stated,
somewhat critical of those troops, and you wanted to make sure
that those troops were caveat-free. Do you believe that these troops
that are coming, hopefully the 5- to 7,000 troops will be, as you
said before, caveat-free and be able to fully engage?
Secretary GATES: One of the positive developments, I would say,
of the last year, but especially since the NATO summit last spring,
has been a fairly steady reduction in the number of caveats that
are being imposed by governments. I think they are realizing—you
heard the German Defense Minister, a couple of weeks ago, for the
first time in Germany, refer to what is going on in Afghanistan as
a ‘‘war,’’ or ‘‘warlike.’’ So, they are, I think, domestically, beginning
to deal with the realities of Afghanistan, and I think that has contributed
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Comment:
This part was just a little funny because there was a big debate about this in Germany.
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4.
Senator KIRK: (...)When—if I understand it, when General McChrystal advocated a
strategy along these lines, it wasn’t just the troops, he said, and
I’m quoting here, ‘‘A foreign army alone cannot beat an insurgency.
The insurgency in Afghanistan requires an Afghan solution. This
is their war.’’ And he went on to say, any success must come,
quote, ‘‘by, with, and through the Afghan government.’’ In other
words, without a legitimate, credible, reliable Afghan governmental
partner, it sounds to me like the strategy would be flawed.
By all reports that we have, President Karzai had been installed,
basically, as a result of a flawed election, if not a fraudulent election,
by default, and that he presides over a culture of corruption
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Comment:
Exactly how it is.
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5.
Senator COLLINS: Thank you.
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates has given an excellent answer
to the question of, ‘‘Why Afghanistan?’’ My question for you is, Can
we succeed, despite the brilliance of our leaders, the courage of our
troops, the efforts of the civilian component? Is this an impossible
task? We have a corrupt and ineffective government as a partner.
We’ve seen, in the last 2 years, even with the presence of NATO
troops, the government lose control of much of the country. Can
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6.
Senator THUNE:— Let me ask—the President, last night, said
that we will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the
door to those Taliban who abandon violence. General Petraeus has
previously indicated that we lacked the nuanced and sophisticated
understanding of the Taliban to identify and distinguish between
reconcilable and irreconcilable elements of the Taliban. And I guess
my question is, How do we go about reliably identifying the reconcilable
elements of the Taliban?
Secretary CLINTON: Well, Senator, there are several efforts already
underway to answer the questions that General Petraeus
and others have posed. As you might know, General McChrystal
has asked General Lamb, a retired British general who was instrumental
in the work that was done in Iraq, to come to Afghanistan
to advise him. The Afghans themselves, led by President Karzai,
have a pretty good idea of who they think can, if persuaded, be reintegrated.
But, this is very much a case-by-case effort. And there are certain
aspects of it that we are very insistent on. One, that they have
to renounce any ties to al Qaeda, and they have to renounce violence,
and they have to be willing to reintegrate into Afghan society
in a peaceful way.
We know that some of the Taliban will not renounce al Qaeda;
they are too closely interconnected. We know that others, who call
themselves ‘‘Taliban’’ want to have a continuing means of, you
know, acting in a military capacity, and we want them, you know,
to have to give up their commitment to violence and, maybe, join
the army, if that’s appropriate, join one of the community defense
initiatives. But, this is very painstaking work. And we have very
high expectations for who we would support reintegrating.
Secretary GATES: Let me just add to that. I think that, here
again, there may be some parallels with Iraq.
First of all, I think that reintegration, particularly at the front
end, is going to be retail, not wholesale. And it is going to—we will
end up, as we did in Iraq, turning to local leaders that we have
confidence in who will, in turn, then vouch for these people and
who will essentially pledge their community to the reliability of
these people that are willing to come away from the Taliban.
A second point, we think that there’s a fair percentage of the foot
soldiers in the Taliban that basically do this for pay. And so, creating
economic opportunities as an alternative in order to support
their families is another vehicle for this.
And finally, to the Admiral’s point, security is essential. Somebody
who—I mean, they—there are too many examples of people
who have tried to leave the Taliban and themselves and all of their
family have been killed. And so, until—in retaliation—and so, until
we can provide a secure environment, at the local level, that gives
them some confidence they can—they will not be retaliated against,
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Comment:
This part of the hearing basically gives us this to know:
- Not all Taliban fighters are the same
- A fair percentage of Taliban fighters do it for money
Clinton als mentioned that Karzai is the leader of Afghans, which is quite ignorant to say after all admittings that Karzai is corrupt.
I checked the trancscript and they didn't talk much or detailed enough about the Afghan government. Some ministers of the Afghan government are warlords, corrupts and criminals. How can Karzai tackle corruption (paradox: he is not a democratic elected president, he is a puppy of the USA) when his brother is a drugdealer king?
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